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Assembly resolution of 1962, the document printed is King Mwami
Mwambutsa's Independence Day Speech . Similarly, for Israel the
text of the General Assembly Resolution is ignored, and all that
appears is the Declaration establishing the State issued by Ben
Gurion and his colleagues .
It is interesting to see a photographic reproduction of the
Declaration of the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic as
well as the United States Declaration of Independence . The authors
obviously had difficulty in the case of the United Kingdom, but their
ingenuity must be admired, since they have come up with the Act for
the Government of Wales, 1536, the Act of Union with Scotland,
1706, and the Dependency of Ireland Act, 1719 .
For Canada, we read : I "While Canada is in virtually all respects
a separate, independent nation, she still retains the official legal
status of an autonomous dominion within the British Commonwealth
[no such statement appears for Australia or New Zealand] . There is
no official document declaring or granting complete independence
from the Crown [nor does the 1907 Proclamation do this for New
Zealand] . The British North American [sic] Act of March 29th, 1867
(the basic document of that part of the Canadian Constitution which
is in writing) established Canada's nationhood as a federal union in
accordance with the principles set forth in its Preamble", and the
Preamble then follows .
Enough has been said to indicate how interesting these two
volumes are .
1 P.105 .
L . C. GREEN*
Anarchism : Nomos XIX . By J . ROLAND PENNOCK and JOHN W .
CHAPMAN . New York : New York University Press . 1978 . Pp .
375. ($17 .50 U.S .)
This collection of eighteen essays attempts to bring some academic
respectability to an unfairly neglected and discredited strand of
political thought . In place of the popular image of the anarchist as a
hirsute fanatic committed to the propagation and glorification of
chaos and terror, the volume strives to present anarchism as a
responsible and rich body of rational thought . Despite the fact that
* L . C . Green, University Professor, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta.
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the anarchists claim to offer a genuine and viable alternative to the
present structure of society and provide a direct challenge to the need
for law and related institutions, legal theorists have consistently
refused to treat such arguments seriously . Not being presented in the
sober and dispassionate tradition to which lawyers are accustomed,
they have felt able to dismiss anarchism as some form of heretical
aberration . Against such a backcloth, this selection of essays seeks
to present a learned and suitably restrained analysis of the anarchist
viewpoint and its implications for today's world .
Many of the problems of the anarchist, of course, are of their
own making . Along with their historical association with all shades
of violent disapproval, a strong vein of anti-intellectualism runs
through the movement . Moreover, there is no real consensus on what
being an anarchist actually means for there are "as many forms of
anarchism as there are anarchists" .' To their credit, the editors
recognise this and one of the main attractions of the publication is the
richness and mixture of arguments that it contains . In short, the
structure of anarchist thought consists of a variety of delicate and
equally-stressed tensions : individualism and communalism ; rational-
ity and spontaneity; romanticism and realism ; violence and pacifi-
cism . Most standpoints are represented in the volume from the
uncompromising rejection of all forms of organised activity to the
equivocal reliance on so-called "ordered anarchy' 1 .2
The volume is divided into five sections with each section
exploring a particular aspect of anarchist thought. Part I is given over
to different perspectives on anarchism in general . In a compact
essay, John P . Clark argues that "any definition which reduces
anarchism to a single dimension . . . must be judged seriously
inadequate" . 'He proceeds to build up a working definition which is
capable of meeting the demands of theory and practice, ancient and
modern: 4
In order for a political theory to be called "anarchism" in a complete sense, it
must contain: (1) a view of an ideal, noncoercive, nonauthoritarian society; (2)
a criticism of existing society and its institutions, based on this antiauthorita-
rian ideal; (3) a view of human nature that justifies the hope for significant
progress toward the ideal; and (4) a strategy for change, involving immediate
institution of noncoercive, nonauthoritarian, and decentralist alternatives .
The beauty of this definition is that it embraces anarchism in a strong
and a weak sense . However, despite the suggestiveness of this
definition, Clark takes a naive view of man's potential for rationality
and sociality, relying on his unestablishable ability to act benevo-
lently and to co-operate willingly .
A different perspective is taken by James M. Buchanan who,
eschewing the possibility of a conceptualised ideal society, adopts a
broadly constitutionalist-contractarian position . In truth, he sits on
i Jean Baechler, Revolution, trans. Joan Vickers (1975), p . 115.
2 P.41 . 3 P.6 . 4 P.13 .
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the theoretical fence . He holds that to abandon all laws entirely
would lead to unmitigated chaos and, therefore, proposes to retain
those rules and principles which "reflect consensus of the
citizenry" .' His essay culminates in an incomprehensible plea for
"ordered anarchy' 1 . 6s In a similar vein, Eric Mack believes that,
while some institutional process is needed to protect the basic
Lockean rights, the notion of the "nightwatchman state", as
popularised by Robert -hlozick, 7 is unacceptable and goes on to
present a searching critique of it . Finally, Richard Falk's essay
pioneers an attempt to examine the implications and insights
anarchism may hold for questions of global order. Interpreting
anarchism as an illuminating posture rather than a politically viable
possibility, he recognizes that, as with socialism, for there to be a
successful revolution anywhere, there must be one everywhere .
Moreover, he astutely points out that violence is for the anarchist,
like the dentist, a necessary, though incidental feature of his
position .
Part If concerns anarchism's attitude to authority. Construing
anarchism as "a timely antidote to political and moral compla-
cency' s Richard T. DeGeorge puts forward the view that, as all
legal theories are an attempt to justify law and as logical justification
in such matters is unattainable, all legal theories are "deliberate or
unconscious ideological rationalisations of the status quo" . 9 In spite
of such a questionable foundational premise, DeGeorge succeeds in
mounting a most persuasive argument for the proposition that
anarchism is not opposed to rules and organisation as such, but only
to their imposition . With a strong Kantian flavour, he claims that
personal moral autonomy is not a license for disorder, but, on the
contrary, carries with it the implied demand for deep respect for any
agreement or promise entered into . Consequently, an anarchist
society can be legitimately built around the twin pillars of
organisation and administration . Sadly, the remaining three essays in
Part II are an uninspiring and unsatisfactory attempt to qualify
DeGeorge's account of philosophical anarchism.
Part III makes a critical examination of the anarchist's attitude
to the traditionally revered rule of law . In the most articulate and
compelling contribution to the whole collection, Lester J. Mazor
maintains, with a true sense of paradox, that responsible and
reasoned civil disobedience is not only preferable to "mere mindless
daily conformity" 1° to law, but can actually enhance and strengthen
respect for law. In a masterly exposure of the ignorance and fear
pervading people's view of anarchism, Mazor draws out the
fundamental opposition of anarchism to law:"
Law claims to be . . . the glue that holds society together, the language of
human interaction, the expression of social solidarity, the objectification of
e P. 37 . e P. 41 . 7 Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) . 8 P. 107 .
	
8 P. 93 .
'OP. 145 . lip. 147.
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social relations . Yet those who embrace anarchy say that law cannot lead to
justice, cannot establish order . Law, in their experience, only denies freedom,
repressesnindividuality, and maintains that greatest of all thieveries-property .
Law cannot create: at best it can clear a path for creativity . Yet each obstacle it
removes appears on closer examination . t o be but something that law itself had
placed in the way, and somehow the work of removal, arduous as it is, only
serves to establish a new set of legal barriers . "No cure for law but more
law" . 12 Law may win a battle, but the ultimate victory ofjustice and order is
always over the hill .
Laying blame at the feet of the legal profession, the police and the
legal process, Mazor concludes that, although there is ample
evidence to demonstrate that the law is becoming increasingly
incapable of commanding respect, the continuance of its authority is
a result of the simple need to shore up the state and secure the
institutions of private property: "In the pursuit of liberation, the
rejection of all forms of rule, and the acceptance of eternal change as
the only constant in experience lies the oft-hidden promise of
anarchy and the source of disrespect for law' 1 .13
The other two essays in Part III attempt to qualify and stabilise
the contagion of Mazor's essay . Lisa Newton seeks to demonstrate
that while Mazor levels his attack against the rule of law, he is in
fact, only opposed to abuse of law . Newton argues he is making a
call for a re-establishment of the rule of law rather than a move to an
anarchist society . Although filled with solid good-sense and
down-to-earth realism, Newton's arguments are unable to stem the
full power and force of Mazor's central contentions . Taking a
slightly different tack, Alan Wertheimer recognizes that universal
disrespect for the law is only one aspect of the anarchist dilemma .
For him, the key problem is what is to take the place of law . With
suitable philosophic resignation, he reluctantly concludes that law
appears necessary if the good life is to be achieved . Suffice it to say
that what amounts to "the good life" is one of the central problems
in the anarchist debate .
Part IV is devoted to so-called anarchist theories of justice, that
is, attempts to explore the possible framework within which an
anarchist society might function . In an imaginative contribution,
Murray N. Rothbard takes man to be a spicy mixture of good and
evil . Accordingly, justice demands that the structure of society
"maximises the opportunities for the good and minimises the
channels for the bad' 1 .14 Equating goodness with the dubious virtues
of the capitalist ethic, Rothbard suggests that such a state of affairs
could be "satisfactorily and efficiently"" maintained by particip-
ants in a free market . In the event of disputes, they will be resolved
by self-determination or voluntary submission to arbitration . In
effect, a sophisticated and natural system of arbitration would take
the place of the existing and state-run legal apparatus . Leaving aside
12 K . Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (1951), p . 106 .




the in-built inequality of the so-called "free market", Rothbard's
arguments are at best flimsy and do not warrant the excessively
optimistic conclusions that he rests upon them . Whatever we would
like to believe it is folly to imagine that social ostracism and
convention will be as effective as the coercive force of the law in
persuading people to comply with arbitration awards .
The remaining two essays in Part IV explore the implications
and feasibility of Rothbard's suggestions. Surprisingly, Christopher
D . Stone gives general approval to his arguments but is concerned
that Rothbard may have compromised to such an extent as to fall
outside the mainstream of the anarchist credo. In truth, both .Rothbard
and Stone, in espousing such a brand of anarchy-capitalism, succeed
in taking a stance that alienates both anarchists and legalists . Such a
view is taken up by David Wieck. In a perspicacious piece, he
dismantles Rothbard's contribution andexposes his work as being an
attempt to "manufacture one or more bourgeois ideology" ."
Interpreting anarchism as an attempt "to realize a human liberation
from every power structure" 17, Wieck holds society to be not an
economic structure of, rights and liberties, but a "functioning
network of voluntary co-operation" . 18 Unfortunately, a promising
essay trails off into a sketchy vision of a future anarchist society
based on mutual agreement and aid which owes more to the utopian
romanticism of the seventeenth century than the cold, yet real
demands of the twentieth century .
Part V, the final section, contains four essays of a very
disappointing and esoteric quality. They are loosely grouped
together under the off-putting title, "The Moral Psychology of
Anarchism" . With aggravating pomposity, Donald McIntosh offers
"an examination of what it is to be an anarchist who thinks
straight" ." Claiming to give "a critical, multidimensional analysis
of anarchism", 2° he arrives at the conclusion that anarchy is
government without politics and adumbrates the four basic principles
of anarchic government: minimal government ; unanimous gov-
ernmental decisions; the obligatoriness and enforceability of such
decisions; and no role differentiation in the governmental process.21
It is not difficult to see that this resembles a watered-down version of
liberal republicanism rather than anarchism. The contributions of
Patrick Riley and Grenville- Wall are of a technical nature and
challenge R. P. Wolff's Kantian thesis" that, as the primary
obligation of man is moral autonomy and as this is logically
incompatible with the concept of de jure authority, the responsible
individual is bound to refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the
state. Whereas Wall relies upon the doubtful premise that moral
authorisation of action cannot lie with individual judgment alone and
16 P. 228 . 17 P. 230 18 Ibid.
is P. 239. 20 Ibid . 21 P. 268. 22 In Defense of Anarchism (1970) .
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must depend upon "public criteria of correctness' 1,23 Riley main-
tains that Wolff's arguments for anarchism make a unacceptable
distortion of Kant's writings .
The final essay of the collection is written by April Carter . In
the light of her previous work 24 this investigation into the anarchist
attitude to violence is something of a disappointment . Admitting that
attitudes are always complex and often contradictory, she jumps
from examining the proposition that, as anarchism is committed to
revolution, it must by implication condone violence to the assertion
that violence is an anathema to the utopianism of anarchism . In
doing this, she offers no real guidance on the validity or acceptability
of their respective claims . For such an accomplished writer on
anarchism, this missed opportunity is to be regretted . The volume is
brought to an end by an accomplished and much-needed bibliog-
raphy on anarchism compiled by Robert A . Kogis .
While this publication makes a significant advance in the
dissemination of anarchist ideas, it is not without weakness . Apart
from the frailty of certain individual contributions, there is an
infuriating failure to distinguish between anarchy, as a state of
affairs, and anarchism, as a body of thought . Further, due to the
rigorous and technical philosophic approach adopted by some
essayists, the volume cannot be recommended without reservation
for the general legal reader. The collection is not intended as an
introductory manual 2' but as a serious attempt to re-work and
enhance the appreciation of the central issues in the anarchist debate .
Notwithstanding this, there is no question that the essays by Mazor
and De George offer fresh and stimulating insights on legal theory
and provide an articulate counter-point to the popularly accepted
view put forward by legal theorists, such as J . C . Smith, that "law is
one of the greatest institutions and social practices ever developed by
man" . 2s
In conclusion, this volume of essays represents a valuable and
welcome addition to the library of contemporary legal thought . It is a
pointed reminder to the legal fraternity that the challenge and
arguments of anarchism warrant respect and must be treated
seriously . It gives a timely prod to the pervading complacency of
many lawyers . However, it must be remembered that, like Marxism,
the lure of anarchism, as an appeal to human aspirations and
freedom, cannot be defined by logical and rational argument alone .
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
23 P . 284 .
24 The Political Theory of Anarchism (1971) and Direct Action and Liberal
Democracy (1973) .
25 For such purposes, see G . Woodcock, Anarchism (1962) and The Anarchist
Reader (1977); James Joll, The Anarchists (1964) ; and Irving L . Hotowitz, The
Anarchists (1964) .
28 Legal Obligation (1976), p . vii .
* Allan C . Hutchinson, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto .
